


MATHEMATICAL LOGIC



& SET THEORY

Book 3

Trivial examples: Fix $x_0 \in X$. Define $\mu(A) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x_0 \notin A \\ 1 & \text{if } x_0 \in A \end{cases}$.

A measurable cardinal is a ^{uncountable} cardinal κ

which admits a nontrivial ~~countably additive~~ two-valued measure.

Does such a κ exist? If so then any larger cardinal satisfies this condition.


Given $\kappa < \kappa'$, μ nontrivial countably additive two-valued measure on κ , lift it to one on κ' . $i: \kappa \rightarrow \kappa'$ injection. Define (for $B \subseteq \kappa'$)

$$\mu'(B) = \mu(i^{-1}(B)).$$

Theorem (Ulam) If there exists a nontrivial countably additive two-valued measure on an uncountable set X then let κ be a smallest example. Then κ has a nontrivial κ -additive two-valued measure for all $\kappa \leq |X|$.

A measurable cardinal is an uncountable cardinal κ having a κ -additive two-valued measure.

Do they exist? And who cares?



μ is κ -additive if

$$\mu\left(\bigsqcup_{\alpha \in I} A_\alpha\right) = \sum_{\alpha \in I} \mu(A_\alpha)$$

for every collection of $|I| < \kappa$ sets $(A_\alpha \subseteq X)$.

$$[0, 1] = \bigsqcup_{\alpha \in [0, 1]} \{\alpha\}$$

Projective Hierarchy $\Sigma'_n, \Pi'_n, \Delta'_n = \Sigma'_n \cap \Pi'_n$

$$\Delta'_0 \subset \Sigma'_1 \supset \Delta'_1 = \Sigma'_1 \cap \Pi'_1 \subset \Sigma'_2 \cap \Pi'_2$$

Borel sets $\Pi'_1 \supset \Pi'_2 \subset$

$\Sigma'_1 = \{ \text{analytic sets in } X \}$ $A \in \Sigma'_1$ iff A is a continuous image of a Borel set under $f: Y \rightarrow X$

$\Pi'_1 = \{ \text{coanalytic sets in } X \} = \{ \text{complements of analytic sets} \}$ (f continuous, Y Polish space)

$\Sigma'_2 = \{ \text{continuous images of coanalytic sets} \}$

If there exist measurable cardinals, then every Σ'_2 -set is Lebesgue measurable.

Coming to: an application a large cardinal to the finite world. see

Non-associative algebra: Keis, Quandles, Racks, Shelves, ... (Sam Nelson, Quandles)

A kei is a set S with a binary operation \triangleright satisfying: for all $x, y, z \in S$,

(1) $x \triangleright x = x$ (every element is idempotent)

(2) $(x \triangleright y) \triangleright y = x$ ($x \mapsto x \triangleright y$ is involutory)

(3) $(x \triangleright y) \triangleright z = (x \triangleright z) \triangleright (y \triangleright z)$ (" \triangleright " is right-distributive over itself)

If (S, \triangleright) satisfies (3), it is a shelf. If it satisfies (1) and (3), it is a rack.
(or self-distributive system)

If (S, \triangleright) satisfies (1), (3) and (2') it is a quandle.

(2'): For all y , the map $S \rightarrow S, x \mapsto x \triangleright y$ is injective.

- (1) $x \triangleright x = x$
- (2) $(x \triangleright y) \triangleright y = x$
- (3) $(x \triangleright y) \triangleright z = (x \triangleright z) \triangleright (y \triangleright z)$

The kei axioms are equivalent to the Reidemeister moves I, II, III.

Examples: Fix $c \in \mathbb{R}$ and define $x \triangleright y = cx + (1-c)y$ for $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. This gives a rack (satisfying (1), (3)). It's a kei if $c = \pm 1$. (?)


More generally let V be a vector space and $R \in GL(V)$ invertible linear transformation. For $u, v \in V$, $u \triangleright v = Ru + (I-R)v$. This is an Alexander quandle. (sometimes a kei).

Example Let G be a group (multiplicative). Fix $n \in \mathbb{Z}$.

For $a, b \in G$, $a \triangleright b = b^n a b^{-n}$ (n -fold conjugation of a by b). This is a rack,

Sometimes a quandle.

Example The Braid group B_n
eg. in B_3 ,



$S_n = \text{Sym}\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$
 $|S_n| = n!$




$B_n \rightarrow S_n$ epimorphism
 $|B_n| = \infty$

Kei colorings of braids

Given a braid $\sigma \in B_n$ and a Kei (K, \triangleright) we color the arcs in a braid diagram of σ (i.e. label the arcs using elements of K) such that



This is the same as requiring that if we label the tops of the n strands, the labels on the bottom are independent of the choice of diagram used for the braid σ .



A right shelf satisfies right-distributivity $(x \triangleright y) \triangleright z = (x \triangleright z) \triangleright (y \triangleright z)$
 ... left ... left ... $x \triangleright (y \triangleright z) = (x \triangleright y) \triangleright (x \triangleright z)$

(K, \triangleright) is left-distributive $\iff (K, \triangleleft)$ is right-distributive where
 $x \triangleleft y = y \triangleright x$ (Transpose the "multiplication table")

Switch to studying left shelves. Example found by Richard Lawer (set theorist in Boulder)

$A_n = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, N=2^n\}$ (integers mod N) Note: 0 is written as $N \text{ mod } N$.

Theorem There is a unique left shelf on A_n satisfying $a \triangleright 1 = a+1$ for all $a \in A_n$.

Ex. $n=2, N=4, A = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} = \text{integers mod } 4$

\triangleright	1	2	3	4
1	2	4	2	4
2	3	4	3	4
3	4	4	4	4
4	1	2	3	4

$$4 \triangleright 2 = 4 \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = (4 \triangleright 1) \triangleright (4 \triangleright 1) = 1 \triangleright 1 = 2$$

$$4 \triangleright 3 = 4 \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = (4 \triangleright 2) \triangleright (4 \triangleright 1) = 2 \triangleright 1 = 3$$

$$4 \triangleright 4 = 4 \triangleright (3 \triangleright 1) = (4 \triangleright 3) \triangleright (4 \triangleright 1) = 3 \triangleright 1 = 4$$

$$3 \triangleright 2 = 3 \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = (3 \triangleright 1) \triangleright (3 \triangleright 1) = 4 \triangleright 4 = 4$$

$$2 \triangleright 2 = 2 \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = (2 \triangleright 1) \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = 3 \triangleright 3 = 4$$

$$2 \triangleright 3 = 2 \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = (2 \triangleright 2) \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = 4 \triangleright 3 = 3$$

$$2 \triangleright 4 = 2 \triangleright (3 \triangleright 1) = (2 \triangleright 3) \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = 3 \triangleright 3 = 4$$

$$1 \triangleright 2 = 1 \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = (1 \triangleright 1) \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = 2 \triangleright 2 = 4$$

$$1 \triangleright 3 = 1 \triangleright (2 \triangleright 1) = (1 \triangleright 2) \triangleright (1 \triangleright 1) = 4 \triangleright 2 = 2$$

Fact: The left-distributive law holds in all cases although we haven't checked this here.

A_0	1
1	1

A_1	1	2
1	2	2
2	1	2

A_2	1	2	3	4
1	2	4	2	4
2	3	4	3	4
3	4	4	4	4
4	1	2	3	4

A_3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	4	6	8	2	4	6	8
2	3	4	7	8	3	4	7	8
3	4	8	4	8	4	8	4	8
4	5	6	7	8	5	6	7	8
5	6	8	6	8	6	8	6	8
6	7	8	7	8	7	8	7	8
7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Figure 2: Multiplication tables for the first four Laver tables

Conjecture As $n \rightarrow \infty$ the period of the first row of the table $\rightarrow \infty$.
 The conjecture holds if there exists a Laver cardinal (a certain kind of large cardinal). No one knows how to prove this in ZFC.

We have an inverse system of left shelves

$$\dots \rightarrow A_4 \rightarrow A_3 \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow A_0$$

Let X be any set and let $M = \{ \text{injective maps } X \rightarrow X \}$.

Then M is a monoid under composition. (A group iff X is finite).

Let A be a set of sentences over some language L , and let $M, N \models A$. (models of A

eg. A : axioms for a ring


L : $+, -, \times$

$\mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{Q} \models A$ and \mathbb{Z} is a submodel of \mathbb{Q} (there is a 1-to-1 map $\mathbb{Z} \xrightarrow{1} \mathbb{Q}$ preserving the operations. But \mathbb{Z} is not elementarily embedded in \mathbb{Q} because

there are sentences ϕ over L such that $\mathbb{Z} \models \phi$, $\mathbb{Q} \models \neg \phi$ (or the other way around) e.g.

eg. $\phi: (\exists x)(\forall y)(\neg(y+y=x))$.

We say $\iota: M \rightarrow N$ ($M, N \models A$) is an elementary embedding if ι is injective and for every sentence ϕ , $\iota(M) \subseteq N$ submodel where $\iota(M)$ is elementarily equivalent to N . For all ϕ , $\iota(M) \models \phi$ iff $N \models \phi$.



A portion of the Koch snowflake curve illustrating self-similarity.

There are many embeddings of \mathbb{C} in itself. Pick such an embedding $\iota: \mathbb{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$. \mathbb{C} , $\iota(\mathbb{C}) \subset \mathbb{C}$ are models of the field axioms A . $\iota(\mathbb{C})$ is an elementary submodel of \mathbb{C} i.e. $\iota: \mathbb{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ is an elementary embedding i.e. \mathbb{C} is an elementary extension of $\iota(\mathbb{C})$.

Note: $\iota: \mathbb{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ preserves $0, 1, +, \times, -$ but not the topology.



For models of ZFC $(L: \in)$ a lower cardinal ^(inaccessible) is a cardinal κ such that the V_κ admits an elementary embedding $\iota: V_\kappa \rightarrow V_\kappa$ which is not surjective. This (ι) generates a left shelf under the following:

If $f, g: X \rightarrow X$ are injective then $f \triangleright g: X \rightarrow X$ is

$$(f \triangleright g)(x) = \begin{cases} fgf^{-1}(x) & \text{if } x \in f(X) \\ x & \text{if } x \notin f(X) \end{cases}$$

$$f(X) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f(x) : x \in X \\ \subset X \end{array} \right\}$$

eg. $f: [0, \infty) \rightarrow [0, \infty)$, $x \mapsto x+1$




Why is \triangleright a left shelf?

$$((f \triangleright g) \triangleright (f \triangleright h))(x)$$

$$= (f \triangleright (g \triangleright h))(x) \quad \text{Check three cases}$$

If $x \in fg(X)$ then $\pi = fg(g)$ so

$$(g \triangleright h)(x) =$$



$\iota: V_k \rightarrow V_k$ is an elementary embedding but not surjective.

It generates a ^{left} shelf under " \triangleright ". This is the free shelf on one generator \mathfrak{F}_1 .

$\mathfrak{F}_1 = \{ \iota, \iota \triangleright \iota, (\iota \triangleright \iota) \triangleright \iota, \iota \triangleright (\iota \triangleright \iota), \dots \}$ These combinations of ι under \triangleright are distinct except when required by the left shelf axiom e.g. $(\iota \triangleright \iota) \triangleright (\iota \triangleright \iota) = \iota \triangleright (\iota \triangleright \iota)$

\mathfrak{F}_1 is a countably infinite left shelf; moreover $\mathfrak{F}_1 = \varprojlim A_n$

Let X be an infinite set. A filter on X is a collection \mathcal{F} of subsets of X such that

(i) $\emptyset \notin \mathcal{F}$, $X \in \mathcal{F}$ (sets in \mathcal{F} are large subsets of X .)

(ii) If $A \in \mathcal{F}$ and $A \subseteq B \subseteq X$ then $B \in \mathcal{F}$.

(iii) If $A, A' \in \mathcal{F}$ then $A \cap A' \in \mathcal{F}$.

By Zorn's lemma, every \mathcal{F} filter extends to an ultrafilter $\mathcal{U} \supseteq \mathcal{F}$ on X which is a filter satisfying

(iv) For all $A \subseteq X$, either A or $X-A$ is in \mathcal{U} .

\mathcal{U} gives a two-valued finitely additive probability measure on X .

To get a nonprincipal ultrafilter on X , we start with the Fréchet filter consisting of all cofinite subsets of X (complements of finite subsets of X) and take $\mathcal{U} \supseteq \mathcal{F}$ a maximal filter containing \mathcal{F} . \mathcal{U} is nonprincipal: \mathcal{U} contains no finite sets.

We take \mathcal{U} to be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\omega = \{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$ and consider the ring $\mathbb{R}^\omega = \{(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots) : a_i \in \mathbb{R}\}$ with coordinatewise operations. \mathbb{R}^ω is a commutative ring with identity, not a field; eg. $(1, 0, 1, 0, \dots)(0, 1, 0, 1, \dots) = (0, 0, 0, 0, \dots) = 0 \in \mathbb{R}^\omega$.

Now identify two sequences $a = (a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots)$, $b = (b_0, b_1, b_2, \dots)$ if they agree almost everywhere with respect to \mathcal{U} i.e. if $\{i \in \omega : a_i = b_i\} \in \mathcal{U}$.

In the case $a = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, \dots)$ we have $a_i = 0$ whenever $i \in \{1, 3, 5, 7, \dots\}$; $b_i = 0$ whenever $i \in \{0, 2, 4, 6, \dots\}$
 $b = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, \dots)$ If $\{1, 3, 5, 7, \dots\} \in \mathcal{U}$ then $a \sim (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots)$ and $b \sim (1, 1, 1, 1, \dots)$
If $\{0, 2, 4, 6, \dots\} \in \mathcal{U}$ then $a \sim (1, 1, 1, 1, \dots)$ and $b \sim (0, 0, 0, 0, \dots)$.

Identify two sequences in \mathbb{R}^{ω} whenever they agree almost everywhere w.r.t. \mathcal{U} .
Then we get a quotient ring $\mathbb{R}^{\omega}/\mathcal{U} = {}^*\mathbb{R}$ denoted $\hat{\mathbb{R}}$ in the handout.

This is the field of nonstandard reals or hyperreals.

${}^*\mathbb{R}$ has the same first order theory (an ordered field and it's a real closed field, e.g. every poly $f(x) \in {}^*\mathbb{R}[x]$ of odd degree has a root in ${}^*\mathbb{R}$). In fact we have an elementary embedding of \mathbb{R} in ${}^*\mathbb{R}$. The main difference between \mathbb{R} and ${}^*\mathbb{R}$ is that \mathbb{R} has no infinite or infinitesimal elements but ${}^*\mathbb{R}$ does.

The Archimedean property says that if $a > 0$ then $\underbrace{a+a+\dots+a}_n = na > 1$ for some n .

$(\forall a)(a > 0 \rightarrow (a+a > 1 \vee a+a+a > 1 \vee a+a+a+a > 1 \vee \dots))$

This property is not expressible in the first order theory of fields.

\mathbb{R} satisfies this property, ${}^*\mathbb{R}$ does not.

E.g. $\varepsilon = (1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{5}, \dots) \in \mathbb{R}^{\omega}$, up to equivalence mod \mathcal{U} , defines an infinitesimal in ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.

$n\varepsilon = (n, \frac{n}{2}, \frac{n}{3}, \frac{n}{4}, \dots) \in \mathbb{R}^{\omega}$, $n\varepsilon < 1$ since this holds for all but the first n terms of

the sequence.

$\frac{1}{\varepsilon} = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots) \in \mathbb{R}^{\omega}$ defines an infinite element of ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.

Every structure M has an enlargement *M .



Los' Theorem If $M_0, M_1, M_2, \dots \models A$ (statements over a language over L) then the ultraproduct

$$\left(\prod_{i \in \omega} M_i \right) / \mathcal{U} \models A.$$

Eg. $A =$ axioms for fields, $M_i = \mathbb{R}$ for all i . $\prod_{i \in \omega} M_i = \{ (m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots) : m_i \in M_i \}$.

Eg. $L =$ language of a single binary relation ' \sim '
 $A =$ axioms for ordinary graphs of degree 3

A model of A , $\Gamma \models A$, is an ordinary graph of degree 3.

For each $i \in \omega$, take $\Gamma_i \models A$ eg. $\Gamma_0 =$ , $\Gamma_1 =$ , $\Gamma_2, \Gamma_3, \dots$

$$\prod_{i \in \omega} \Gamma_i = \Gamma_0 \times \Gamma_1 \times \Gamma_2 \times \dots = \{ (v_0, v_1, v_2, v_3, \dots) : v_i \in \Gamma_i \}$$

\mathcal{U} a nonprincipal ultrafilter on ω

i.e. v_i is a vertex in Γ_i .

Now $\left(\prod_{i \in \omega} \Gamma_i \right) / \mathcal{U}$ is the set of equiv. classes of sequences $v = (v_0, v_1, v_2, \dots)$.

If $v, w \in \left(\prod_{i \in \omega} \Gamma_i \right) / \mathcal{U}$ then $v \sim w$ iff $v_i \sim w_i$ for almost all i i.e. $\{ i \in \omega : v_i \sim w_i \} \in \mathcal{U}$.

This graph Γ has degree 3. If Γ_i has order $\leq n$ for some n then Γ is a graph of order $\leq n$. why? Let θ be the first-order statement that Γ_i has at most n vertices.

Since $\Gamma_i \models \theta$, $\Gamma := \left(\prod_{i \in \omega} \Gamma_i \right) / \mathcal{U} \models \theta$.

You can take the "*" operation applied to any standard mathematical object, e.g.

$$\mathbb{R} \xrightarrow{*} {}^*\mathbb{R}, \quad S \xrightarrow{*} {}^*S \quad ({}^*S = S \text{ if } |S| < \infty).$$

If $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, then $f: {}^*\mathbb{R} \rightarrow {}^*\mathbb{R}$ "enlarges" f . How do we define $f(x)$ for $x \in \mathbb{R}^*$? x is represented by $(a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots) \in \mathbb{R}^\omega$ (extends)

$f(x)$ is represented by $(f(a_0), f(a_1), f(a_2), \dots) \in \mathbb{R}^\omega$. The equiv. class of this sequence is well-defined in ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.

Suppose $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is differentiable. Classically,

$$f'(a) = \lim_{t \rightarrow 0} \frac{f(a+t) - f(a)}{t}.$$

The nonstandard approach:

$$f'(a) = \text{st} \left[\frac{f(a + \varepsilon) - f(\varepsilon)}{\varepsilon} \right] \text{ where } \varepsilon \text{ is an infinitesimal}$$

st: bounded hyperreals to reals. "st(x)" is the standard part of x , i.e. the unique real closest to x (infinitely close).

${}^*\mathbb{R}$ has the order topology which is not metrizable and not separable.

Integrals can be similarly defined in a nonstandard way: if f is Lebesgue

integrable then

$$\int_a^b f(t) dt = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(a + i \Delta x) \Delta x \right]$$

where N is an unbounded hypernatural number

$$\Delta x = \frac{b-a}{N}$$

Hypernatural numbers ${}^*N = \left(\prod_{i \in \omega} N \right) / \mathcal{U}$

$N = \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$. Sequences $(n_0, n_1, n_2, \dots) \in N^\omega \pmod{\mathcal{U}}$ gives *N .

$$N \subset {}^*N$$

*N looks like 

$$|{}^*N| = |{}^*\mathbb{R}| = |\mathbb{R}| = 2^{\aleph_0}$$

$$2^{\aleph_0} \stackrel{?}{\leq} |{}^*N| \leq |N^\omega| = \aleph_0^{\aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_0}$$

Given $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ (real) consider the sequence $u_\alpha = (\lceil \alpha \rceil, \lceil 2\alpha \rceil, \lceil 3\alpha \rceil, \lceil 4\alpha \rceil, \dots)$

If $\alpha < \beta$ in $(0, 1)$ then $u_\alpha < u_\beta$ $\in N^\omega$
 $u_\alpha \not\sim u_\beta \pmod{\mathcal{U}}$

An example of an elementary statement about \mathbb{R} that has a (possibly) shorter nonstandard proof than standard proof:

Theorem (Sierpinski) If a_1, \dots, a_k, b are positive reals then

$$\left| \left\{ (n_1, \dots, n_k) \in \mathbb{N}^k : \frac{a_1}{n_1} + \frac{a_2}{n_2} + \dots + \frac{a_k}{n_k} = b \right\} \right| < \infty.$$

This statement was proved using elementary methods by Sierpinski.

A later nonstandard proof by Ross:

Suppose $S = \left\{ (n_1, \dots, n_k) \in \mathbb{N}^k : \frac{a_1}{n_1} + \dots + \frac{a_k}{n_k} = b \right\}$ is infinite. Then

* S contains a solution (n_1, \dots, n_k) where not all $n_i \in \mathbb{N}$ (some n_i 's are unbounded),

say $n_1, \dots, n_r \in \mathbb{N}^* - \mathbb{N}$; $n_{r+1}, \dots, n_k \in \mathbb{N}$; $1 \leq r \leq k$. There

$$\underbrace{\frac{a_1}{n_1} + \dots + \frac{a_r}{n_r}}_{\text{positive infinitesimal}} = b - \underbrace{\frac{a_{r+1}}{n_{r+1}} - \dots - \frac{a_k}{n_k}}_{\in \mathbb{R} \text{ (bounded)}}. \quad \text{Contradiction.}$$

We have first-order axioms for group theory.

Axioms for the class of abelian groups:

- axioms of group theory
- $(\forall x)(\forall y)(xy = yx)$

Axioms for class of nonabelian groups

- axioms for group theory
- $(\exists x)(\exists y)(xy \neq yx)$.

There is no first-order axiomatization of the class of cyclic groups.

Cyclic: $(\exists g)(\forall x)(\exists n \in \mathbb{Z})(x = g^n)$

Not permissible in first order group theory.

If there were a list of axioms A for the theory of cyclic groups then

$(\prod_{i \in \mathbb{N}} C_{i+2}) / \mathcal{U}$ is a group of order 2^{\aleph_0} , not cyclic.
↑
cyclic of order 2

$(C_2 \times C_3 \times C_4 \times C_5 \times \dots) / \mathcal{U}$ is not cyclic.

A shorter argument that the class of cyclic groups is not first order axiomatizable:
 Suppose A is a collection of statements in first order group theory such that
 $G \models A \iff G$ is a cyclic group. There exists an infinite model (additive \mathbb{Z})
 so by the Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, there exist models of arbitrary
 large cardinality. Take any uncountable model $G \models A$; then G is not cyclic.

Let A be a set of statements in graph theory such that
 $\Gamma \models A \iff \Gamma$ is a graph of degree 2.
 Note: this equivalent to saying Γ is a disjoint union of cycles



Let A be the axioms for field theory (the language $0, 1, +, -, \times$).
 $\mathbb{F}_p \models A$ is the field of prime order p ; $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ = algebraic closure of \mathbb{F}_p
 $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is countably infinite
 Let $F = \left(\prod_p \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \right) / \mathcal{U} = (\overline{\mathbb{F}}_2 \times \overline{\mathbb{F}}_3 \times \overline{\mathbb{F}}_5 \times \overline{\mathbb{F}}_7 \times \dots) / \mathcal{U}$ of characteristic p ($\underbrace{1+1+\dots+1}_p = 0$)

Since $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models A$, F is a field. What is it? $F \cong \mathbb{C}$.
 ($\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is a field)

$F = \left(\prod_{p \text{ prime}} \bar{\mathbb{F}}_p \right) / \mathcal{U}$ is a field of characteristic zero.

It is algebraically closed. (Each $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is alg. closed as we described in the first month.)

The theory of alg. closed fields of characteristic zero is uncountably categorical.
 $|F| = 2^{\aleph_0}$ (look back four pages) so $F \cong \mathbb{C}$.

Now consider $F = \left(\prod_p \bar{\mathbb{F}}_p \right) / \mathcal{U} = (\bar{\mathbb{F}}_2 \times \bar{\mathbb{F}}_3 \times \bar{\mathbb{F}}_5 \times \bar{\mathbb{F}}_7 \times \bar{\mathbb{F}}_{11} \times \dots) / \mathcal{U}$.

This is a field. It's a subfield of \mathbb{C} (up to isomorphism).
It has characteristic zero. $|F| = 2^{\aleph_0}$. $F \neq \mathbb{C}$ since F has irreducible poly's of every degree. (for every $n \geq 1$, there exists a poly. $f(x) \in F[x]$ of degree n which is irreducible. But so what, \mathbb{Q} also has this property.)

$\mathbb{R}[x]$ has irred. poly's of degree 2 but they all give rise to \mathbb{C} :

\mathbb{R} has a unique extension field of degree 2. \mathbb{Q} has infinitely many extension fields of degree 2. $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$ has a unique extension of each degree $n \geq 1$.

F is an uncountable field of char. 0 having a unique extension field of each degree $n \geq 1$.

Take a subset $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega = \{(n_0, n_1, n_2, \dots) : n_i \in \mathbb{N}\}$. Two players, Alice and Bob, take turns picking elements of $\mathbb{N} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, \dots\}$ starting with Alice, resulting in a play $x = (a_0, b_0, a_1, b_1, a_2, b_2, \dots) \in \mathbb{N}^\omega$. If $x \in S$, then A wins. If $x \in \mathbb{N}^\omega - S$, B wins.

Eg. S is the set of eventually constant sequences. This has a winning strategy for Bob.

Eg. S is the set of eventually periodic sequences. Bob's advantage.

Eg. S is any countable collection of sequences, i.e. $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$, $|S| = \aleph_0$.

Bob has a winning strategy. Enumerate $S = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots\}$. On turn j , Bob chooses any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ which differs from the $2j$ -indexed term in s_j .

Eg. S is the set of sequences having no '3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9' as subsequence. Alice has a winning strategy.

Eg. S is the set of 'universal' sequences in \mathbb{N}^ω (sequences containing every finite sequence of natural numbers appears as a consecutive subsequence). Bob can play 2, 2, 2, ... to win.

A strategy is a function: $\mathbb{N}^{<\omega} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. A strategy for Alice (or Bob) is a winning strategy if the player in question is guaranteed to win if they follow that strategy.

Axiom of Determinacy (AD): for every $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$, either Alice or Bob has a winning strategy for the game G_S .

Theorem (Gale, Stewart) Every open game is determined: either Alice or Bob has a winning strategy.

Topology of \mathbb{N}^ω : \mathbb{N} has the discrete topology: every subset of \mathbb{N} is open.

A basic open set: Given $(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{N}^{\text{finite}}$, $(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) \times \mathbb{N}^\omega = \{(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}, x_n, x_{n+1}, \dots) : x_n, x_{n+1}, x_{n+2}, \dots \in \mathbb{N}\}$ is a basic open set.

An open set is an arbitrary union of basic open sets.

If $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$ is open, then G_S is determined.

The condition that $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$ is open means that all winning plays for Alice are determined after a finite number of moves.

An example of an open set is the set of all sequences $(x_0, x_1, x_2, \dots) \in \mathbb{N}^\omega$ containing any prime number i.e. $x_n = 3077664399$ for some n .

It is $\bigcup_{n=0}^{\infty} U_n$: $U_n = \{(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}, 3077664399, x_{n+1}, x_{n+2}, \dots) : x_i \in \mathbb{N}\}$

This set is open but not closed: its complement is not open.

Also, if $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$ is closed, then G_S is determined. More generally, if $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\omega$ is a Borel set, the game G_S is determined.

Consider $S = \{ (a_0, b_0, a_1, b_1, \dots) : a_0 \in \mathbb{N} \text{ arbitrary, } b_n \text{ odd, } a_{n+1} + 1 = b_n > a_n \text{ for all } n \geq 1 \}$

Alice has a winning strategy.

Typical play: $(\overset{a_0}{1}, \overset{b_0}{48}, \overset{a_1}{47}, \overset{b_1}{46}, \overset{a_2}{45}, \overset{b_2}{44}, \overset{a_3}{43}, \dots, \overset{a_{23}}{3}, \overset{b_{23}}{2}, \overset{a_{24}}{1})$

Alice has won; this game has value 0 ("0 moves remaining for Alice to win").

$(1, 48, 47, \dots, 3, 2)$ has value 0.

$(1, 48, 47, \dots, 4, 3)$ has value 1.

$(1, 48, 47, \dots, 5, 4)$ " " " " 1.

\vdots
 $(1, 48, 47)$ has value 22.

$(1, 48)$ " " "

(1) has value $\omega = \sup \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$

$()$ has value $\omega + 1$.

In general, for every position of the game in which Alice has a winning strategy, we assign a value to that position which is an ordinal. '0' means Alice has won already, '1' means 1 move to reach a position of value 0, etc. Some positions will not have any value assigned; these are winning positions for Bob.

The value is defined recursively as follows:

Case I: It's Bob's turn. Position $(a_0, b_0, a_1, b_1, \dots, a_n)$, $n \geq 0$.

Define the value of (a_0, b_0, \dots, a_n) to be the sup of the values of $(a_0, b_0, \dots, a_n, b)$ for $b \in \mathbb{N}$ (if these sequences have values).

Case II: It's Alice's turn. Position $(a_0, b_0, a_1, b_1, \dots; a_{n-1}, b_{n-1})$, $n \geq 0$ (ie. $()$ if $n=0$).
This position has value $\alpha+1$ where α is the min value of $(a_0, b_0, a_1, b_1, \dots, a_{n-1}, b_{n-1}, a)$, $a \in \mathbb{N}$
assuming there exist any such positions of value.

More generally, take any set X and consider games determined by $S \subseteq X^\omega$
(typically $X = \{0, 1\}$ or \mathbb{N}).

AD is independent of ZF.

AD is inconsistent with AC i.e. $\text{ZF} \vdash (\text{AD} \rightarrow \neg \text{AC})$.