


MATHEMATICAL LOGIC



& SET THEORY

Book 1

Group Theory: an example of a first-order axiomatic system

An informal proof in group theory

Theorem If G is a (multiplicative) group of exponent 2, then G is abelian.

(G has exponent n if $g^n = 1$ for all $g \in G$.)

(Informal) proof: Let $a, b \in G$. Since $abab = (ab)^2 = 1$, multiplying on the left by "a" and on the right by "b" gives $aababb = a1b$, i.e. $ba = ab$. \square

Axioms of Group Theory:

ID: $(\forall x) ((x * 1 = x) \wedge (1 * x = x))$

ASSOC: $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z) ((x * y) * z = x * (y * z))$

INV: $(\forall x) (\exists y) ((x * y = 1) \wedge (y * x = 1))$

Start with names for variables x, y, z, \dots (symbols)
Special symbols for first order logic: \exists, \forall , parentheses, \neg, \rightarrow, \dots

Symbols for constants: $1, \dots$

Symbols for functions: $*$, ... $x * y$ means $\mu(x, y)$

Symbols for relations: $=$

We happen to know some groups including C_n (cyclic group of order n), S_n (symmetric group of degree n), ...

GROUPS = $\{ID, ASSOC, INV\} = \{(\forall x)((x * 1) = \dots, \dots, \dots)\}$ (the set consisting of our three axioms of group theory)

S_5 is a group, i.e. $S_5 \models$ GROUPS (S_5 is a model of GROUPS)

ABEL: $(\forall x)(\forall y) (x * y = y * x)$

ABEL-GPS = GROUPS \cup {ABEL}. S_5 is a non-abelian group; $S_5 \not\models$ ABEL; $S_5 \not\models$ ABEL-GPS.

A structure has an underlying set of elements, together with an interpretation of all the symbols for constants, functions, and relations.

How do we rewrite our informal proof (above) as a formal proof in first order logic?

$\Sigma = \text{GROUPS} \cup \{\text{EXP2}\}$ where $\text{EXP2}: (\forall x)(x*x=1)$

ABEL is a theorem in the theory of groups of exponent 2, i.e. $\Sigma \vdash \text{ABEL}$.

A theorem is a sequence of steps $\Sigma \vdash \square$ in which every step follows from previous steps by a statement in Σ , or an axiom of first order logic, or a rule of inference.

$\Sigma \vdash \square$
 $\Sigma \vdash \square$
 $\Sigma \vdash \square$
 \vdots
 $\Sigma \vdash \square$

This is a formal (symbolic) proof!

An outline of a formal proof: $\Sigma \vdash \text{EXP2}$ since $\text{EXP2} \in \Sigma$

$\Sigma \vdash (\text{EXP2} \rightarrow (\forall a)(a*a=1))$ (A4) p.86

$\Sigma \vdash (\forall a)(a*a=1)$ Modus Ponens (R1) p.86

$\Sigma \vdash (\forall b)(b*b=1)$

$\Sigma \vdash (\forall a)(\forall b)((a*b)*(a*b)=1)$

$\Sigma \vdash (\forall a)(\forall b)((a*(a*b))*(a*b)=a*1)$

$\Sigma \vdash (\forall a)(\forall b)(a*b=b*a)$

RICHARDS BORCHERDS
 JOEL DAVID HAMKINS

$\text{ORD3}: (\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists z)[(\forall q)((q=x) \vee (q=y) \vee (q=z)) \wedge (\overset{x \neq y}{\neg(x=y)}) \wedge (\overset{x \neq z}{\neg(x=z)}) \wedge (\overset{y \neq z}{\neg(y=z)})]$

"there are at most three elements"

"there are at least 3 elements"

ABEL is independent of GROUPS (you cannot either prove or disprove that a general group is abelian). GROUPS $\not\vdash$ ABEL and GROUPS $\not\vdash \neg$ ABEL. This is because $C_3 \models \text{GROUPS}$ but $C_3 \not\models \text{ABEL}$ and $S_3 \models \text{GROUPS}$ but $S_3 \not\models \text{ABEL}$.

In an arbitrary first-order theory, with axioms Σ , a statement θ is independent of Σ if

$\Sigma \not\vdash \theta$ and $\Sigma \not\vdash \neg\theta$:

Soundness Theorem: If $\Sigma \vdash \theta$ then θ holds in every model of Σ i.e. $M \models \theta$ whenever $M \models \Sigma$.

Completeness Theorem: Converse holds: If θ holds in every model of Σ , then it is provable from Σ i.e. if $M \models \theta$ whenever $M \models \Sigma$, then $\Sigma \vdash \theta$.

Assume Σ is consistent

So: θ is independent of Σ iff there are models of Σ in which θ holds, and models of θ in which θ fails.

Σ is consistent if we cannot prove a contradiction from Σ , i.e. $\Sigma \not\vdash (\theta \wedge \neg\theta)$ for some θ .

Equivalently, Σ is consistent iff it has a model.

Eq. ABEL is independent of GROUPS.

ORDS

GROUPS is consistent.

GROUPS \cup {ORDS} is consistent since it has a model. In fact it has a unique model up to isomorphism: the cyclic group C_3 of order 3. The group C_3 (or its theory) is categorical.
GROUPS is not categorical. (There are models, but not a unique model.)

An alternative to MV: $(\forall x)(\exists y)((x*y=1) \wedge (y*x=1))$ is to add a function symbol $\iota(\cdot)$ to the language
namely $(\forall x)((x*\iota(x)=1) \wedge (\iota(x)*x=1))$
We already have a binary function symbol $\mu(\cdot, \cdot)$, $\mu(x,y) = x*y$

A theorem of Σ is a statement that can be proved from Σ . A proof is a sequence of statements such....
The theory of Σ is $Th(\Sigma) = \{ \text{statements provable from } \Sigma \} = \{ \text{theorems of } \Sigma \}$.

First order theory of graphs has no symbols for constants or functions; there is only one relation symbol $R(\cdot, \cdot)$, for the binary relation of adjacency. We will abbreviate $R(x, y)$ as $x \sim y$.

Axioms of graph theory: two axioms to indicate that our relation is symmetric and reflexive.

IRREFL: $(\forall x) (\neg(x \sim x))$

SYM: $(\forall x)(\forall y) ((x \sim y) \rightarrow (y \sim x))$

GRAPHS = $\{IRREFL, SYM\}$



\models GRAPHS



$\not\models$ GRAPHS

MIN7: $(\exists x_1)(\exists x_2) \dots (\exists x_7) ((x_1 = x_2) \wedge \dots \wedge (x_6 = x_7))$

"there are at least 7 vertices"

MAX7: $(\exists x_1)(\exists x_2) \dots (\exists x_7) (\forall y) ((y = x_1) \vee \dots \vee (y = x_7))$

"There are at most 7 vertices"

To say that Γ has exactly 7 vertices, we could write

ORD7: $(\exists x_1)(\exists x_2) \dots (\exists x_7) [((x_1 = x_2) \wedge \dots \wedge (x_6 = x_7)) \wedge (\forall y) ((y = x_1) \vee (y = x_2) \vee \dots \vee (y = x_7))]$

GRAPHS \cup $\{ORD7\}$: axioms for graphs with exactly 7 vertices

Axioms for infinite graphs:

GRAPHS \cup $\{MIN1, MIN2, MIN3, MIN4, \dots\}$

In first order graph theory, we cannot express the condition that a graph is finite. We can express the condition that a graph has at most n vertices.

We cannot express the condition that a graph is countably infinite.

The diameter of a graph is the max. distance between two vertices.

The distance between two vertices is the length of the shortest path between them.

eg. To say that a graph has diameter ≥ 2 in first order logic:

$(\forall x)(\forall y) ((x = y) \rightarrow (\underbrace{(x \sim y)}_{\text{dist}(x,y)=1}) \vee (\underbrace{(\exists z) (x \sim z) \wedge (z \sim y)}_{\text{dist}(x,y) \leq 2}))$

Diameter ≤ 2 :

$(\text{diameter at most } 2) \wedge (\exists x)(\exists y) (\neg(x \sim y) \wedge \neg(x \sim z))$

In first order theory, we can express the condition that a graph has diameter 7 or diameter at most 7 but we cannot express the notion that a graph is connected.

Graphs of diameter ≤ 1 (i.e. cliques): $\text{GRAPHS} \cup \{(\forall x)(\forall y)(x=y) \vee (x \sim y)\} = \text{COMPL_GRPHS}$

has models $K_0, K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4, \dots$

For each cardinality κ (eg. $\kappa = 0, 5, \aleph_0, 2^{\aleph_0}, \dots$) there is a model $K_\kappa \models \text{COMPL_GRPHS}$

and any two models of the countably infinite same cardinality are isomorphic. $|\mathbb{R}| = \text{continuum}$

$\text{COMPL_GRPHS} \cup \{\text{ORD4}\}$ has a unique model $K_\kappa = \square$ up to isomorphism.

$\text{Th}(K_\kappa) = \{ \text{all statements in graph theory that hold in } K_\kappa \}$

K_κ (or $\text{Th}(K_\kappa)$) is categorical: K_κ is the unique model (up to isomorphism) of

$\text{COMPL_GRPHS} \cup \{\text{ORD4}\}$ or of $\text{Th}(K_\kappa)$


$\text{COMPL_GRPHS} \cup \{\text{MIN1, MIN2, ...}\}$ has infinitely many models. But for each cardinality κ , there is only one model (up to isomorphism) of cardinality κ .

"there are inf. many vertices"

This theory is not categorical but it is κ -categorical.

Consider the graph with countably infinite vertex set $\{5, 13, 17, 29, 37, 41, 53, 61, \dots\}$ (all primes $\equiv 1 \pmod{4}$).

We say $p \sim q$ if p is a nonsquare mod q (iff q is a nonsquare mod p , by Quadratic Reciprocity).
 eg. $5 \sim 13$ ($0, 1, 4$ are squares mod 5 but $2, 3$ are nonsquares mod 5).



Let's call this graph $R \equiv \text{GRAPHS} \cup \{\text{INF}\} \cup \{\mathcal{T}_{m,n} : m, n \in \mathbb{N}\}$

Quadratic Reciprocity
 Dirichlet's Theorem
 Chinese Remainder Theorem

$$\mathcal{T}_{m,n} : (\forall x_i)(\forall y_j) \cdot (\forall x_m)(\forall y_1)(\forall y_2) \dots (\forall y_n) ((x_i, y_j \text{ distinct}) \rightarrow (\exists z) (z \sim x_1 \wedge \dots \wedge z \sim x_m \wedge z \not\sim y_1 \wedge \dots \wedge z \not\sim y_n))$$

$$x_i \neq x_j \wedge x_i \neq y_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_i \neq y_n \wedge y_1 \neq y_2$$

$\mathcal{T}_{2,0}, \mathcal{T}_{1,1}, \mathcal{T}_{0,2}$



$R =$ Random graph = Erdős-Rényi graph = Rado graph = Universal Graph

Take any countably infinite set V as vertices.

For all $x \neq y$ in V , flip a coin. Heads? join $x \sim y$. Tails? $x \not\sim y$ (unjoined).
 With probability $1/2$, $R \equiv \mathcal{T}_{m,n}$ for all m, n ; even if the coin is biased.

Theorem Every countably infinite graph satisfying $\mathcal{T}_{m,n}$ for all m, n is isomorphic to R .


$\text{GRAPHS} \cup \{\text{INF}\} \cup \{\mathcal{T}_{m,n} : m, n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ has only one countable model. (up to isomorphism).

↑ don't need this axiom; it follows from $\{\mathcal{T}_{m,n} : m, n \in \mathbb{N}\}$


ie. R is \aleph_0 -categorical (countably categorical).

RANDOM :=

Proof First try, via greedy construction of a map $\Gamma \rightarrow \Gamma'$.
Suppose $\Gamma, \Gamma' \in \text{RANDOM}$ and Γ, Γ' have a countably infinite set of vertices.





Γ



Γ'

Second try: Back-and-forth construction of isomorphism $\Gamma \rightarrow \Gamma'$




Question: Is there a universal random graph on $|R| = 2^{\aleph_0}$ vertices?

Status of this problem is not fully known, but independent of ZFC, depends on CH; (Shelah)

Chromatic numbers of graphs:

Given a graph Γ , a proper (vertex) coloring of Γ is a coloring of the vertices so that no two vertices of the same color are joined. The chromatic number of Γ , $\chi(\Gamma)$, is the smallest number of colors for which Γ has a proper coloring. Eg.


$$\chi(\Gamma) = 3.$$

Theorem (Appel-Haken) If Γ is a ^{finite} planar graph, then $\chi(\Gamma) \leq 4$.

From this result, the generalization to infinite planar graphs holds:

If Γ is any planar graph, then $\chi(\Gamma) \leq 4$.

First express the condition $\chi(\Gamma) \leq k$ in first order logic:

Language in any first-order system has symbols for constants, r -ary functions, r -ary relations.

We are given a graph Γ and a positive integer k .

Introduce constants v_1, v_2, \dots , one for each vertex of the graph. Also k many relations $C_1(\cdot), \dots, C_k(\cdot)$.

Axioms: $(\forall x)((C_1(x) \vee C_2(x) \vee \dots \vee C_k(x)) \wedge \neg((C_1(x) \wedge C_2(x)) \vee (C_1(x) \wedge C_3(x)) \vee \dots \vee (C_{k-1}(x) \wedge C_k(x))))$

For every pair of adjacent vertices i, j in Γ , include an axiom $\neg(C_l(v_i) \wedge C_l(v_j))$ and each l in $\{1, 2, \dots, k\}$.

Let $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ be the set of axioms listed here. A model of $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$, i.e. $M \models \Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$, is a proper k -coloring of Γ . Such a model exists $\iff \chi(\Gamma) \leq k$.

By the compactness theorem, $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ has a model iff every finite subset of $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ has a model i.e. iff every finite subgraph of Γ has chromatic number $\leq k$.

More generally, if Γ is any infinite graph, then $\chi(\Gamma) = k$ iff every finite subgraph $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ has $\chi(\Gamma_0) \leq k$; and $\chi(\Gamma_0) = k$ for some finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$.

By the way, the compactness theorem follows easily from the completeness theorem. We won't prove the completeness theorem. Here's the argument in the case of graph coloring:

If $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ has a model $M \models \Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$, then every finite subset $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ has a model $M \models \Sigma_0$. Conversely, suppose every finite subset $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ has a model ("every finite subgraph $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ is properly k -colorable"). Suppose $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ does not have a model (Γ is not properly k -colorable). This says $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ is inconsistent and we can derive a contradiction from $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ by the completeness theorem i.e.

$\Sigma_{\Gamma, k} \vdash (\theta \wedge \neg\theta)$ for some θ . A proof of $\theta \wedge \neg\theta$ from $\Sigma_{\Gamma, k}$ only uses finitely many of our constants v_i , C_j and relations. These v_i 's lie in a finite subgraph $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$. This is a contradiction.



is not planar: it has K_5 as a minor.

Axioms for linear (total) order:

Language: single binary relation symbol $R(\cdot, \cdot)$. We denote $R(x, y)$ by $x < y$.

Axioms for linear order: $(\forall x)(\forall y) ((x=y) \vee (x < y) \vee (y < x))$

Nonempty axiom: $(\exists x)(x=x)$

$(\forall x)(\forall y) (\neg(x=y) \leftrightarrow ((x < y) \vee (y < x)))$

$(\forall x)(\forall y) (\neg((x < y) \wedge (y < x)))$

$(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z) (((x < y) \wedge (y < z)) \rightarrow (x < z))$

Dense linear order without endpoints:

axioms for linear order

$(\forall x)(\forall y) ((x < y) \rightarrow (\exists z) ((x < z) \wedge (z < y)))$

$(\forall x)(\exists y) (x < y)$

$(\forall x)(\exists y) (y < x)$



Models of "dense linear order without endpoints":


Here are three models, no two of which are isomorphic.

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (0, 1) \subset \mathbb{R}, \text{ with usual } '<' \\ \mathbb{R} \text{ with usual } '<' \\ \mathbb{Q} \text{ with ordinary } '<' \end{array} \right\}$ isomorphic

There are many uncountable models. For every uncountable cardinality κ , there are many models of cardinality κ .

$\left[\begin{array}{l} \mathbb{Q} \text{ with ordinary } '<' \\ \mathbb{Q} \cup (0, 1) \text{ with ordinary } '<' \end{array} \right]$

Theorem ^(Cantor) $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$ is "dense linear order without endpoints" \models the unique countable model up to isomorphism.



The theory of dense linear orders without endpoints is \aleph_0 -categorical (countably categorical).

Other \aleph_0 -categorical theories: the theory of the complete graph; the theory of the random graph.

"Dense linear order without endpoints" is not \aleph_1 -categorical for any uncountable cardinality.

Theorem (Morley) If a theory is \aleph_1 -categorical for some uncountable cardinality \aleph_1 , then it is \aleph_1 -categorical for all uncountable \aleph_1 (hence "uncountably categorical").

Linear Algebra: what are suitable axioms for vector spaces? Fix a field F and write down axioms for vector spaces over F . One way: All elements of the domain (underlying set of the model) are vectors. Implement scalar multiplication using unary functions $\mu_c(\cdot)$ $c \in F$ in addition to binary function "+" for adding vectors. We'll also use a constant symbol '0'.

Axioms:

- $(\forall v)(\forall w)(v+w = w+v)$
- $(\forall u)(\forall v)(\forall w)((u+v)+w = u+(v+w))$
- $(\forall v)(0+v = v)$

Axiom Schema

- $(\forall v)(\mu_c(\mu_d(v)) = \mu_{cd}(v))$ (for every $c, d \in F$ we have such an axiom)
- $(\forall v)(\mu_c(v) + \mu_d(v) = \mu_{cd}(v))$
- $(\forall v)(\forall w)(\mu_c(v+w) = \mu_c(v) + \mu_c(w))$

$$(\forall v)(\mu_1(v) = v)$$

$$(\forall v)(\mu_0(v) = 0)$$

Models of this theory are vector spaces over F .

There can be nonisomorphic models of the same cardinality.

Suppose $F = \mathbb{Q}$. For every uncountable K , there is a unique model of cardinality K up to isomorphism (the theory of rational vector spaces is uncountably categorical) but not for $K = \aleph_0$: there are infinitely many vector spaces of cardinality \aleph_0 .

$$\mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{Q}^2, \mathbb{Q}^3, \mathbb{Q}^4, \dots, \mathbb{Q}^\omega = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{Q}^n$$

Think of $\mathbb{Q}^\omega = \mathbb{Q}[t]$ as the vector space of all polynomials in t with rational coefficients;

$$\mathbb{Q}^n = \{ f(t) \in \mathbb{Q}[t] : \deg f(t) < n \} \quad \text{has basis } \{1, t, t^2, t^3, \dots, t^{n-1}\}$$

$$\mathbb{Q}^\omega \text{ has basis } \{1, t, t^2, t^3, \dots\}$$

$$\mathbb{Q}[t]$$

Don't confuse with $\mathbb{Q}[[t]]$ = all power series in t with rational coefficients which has uncountable dimension.

Theorem of Engeler, Ryll-Nardzewski, Svenonius: \aleph_0 -categoricity of M is equivalent to a "large" group of automorphisms of M : $\text{Aut } M$ has only finitely many orbits on k -tuples of "points" (elements of M). Such a group is called oligomorphic. Examples

Any two k -sets of distinct rationals are in the same orbit of $\text{Aut}(\mathbb{Q}, <)$.
For the countable random graph R , the number of orbits on k -sets of distinct vertices for $k=1, 2, 3, 4, \dots$ gives a sequence

1, 2, 4, 11, 34, ...

Nothing is better than a meal in a four-star restaurant.

A plain cafeteria meal is better than nothing.

Therefore a plain cafeteria meal is better than a meal in a four-star restaurant.

Why would we not allow the domain of a model (the underlying set) to be empty?

$$\vdash (\forall x)(\phi(x)) \rightarrow \phi(a)$$

$$\vdash \phi(a) \rightarrow (\exists x)(\phi(x))$$

$$\vdash (\forall x)(\phi(x)) \rightarrow (\exists x)(\phi(x))$$

Clarification: structure vs. model

We start with a language L (symbols for constants, relations, functions).

Any interpretation of the symbols in L on an underlying set (domain) is a structure for L (an L -structure). Given a language L and a set of sentences Σ over L ,

a model of Σ is an L-structure M satisfying Σ i.e. every sentence $\theta \in \Sigma$ is satisfied by M ; we denote $M \models \Sigma$.

How do we understand the statement that if κ is an uncountable cardinal, then a rational vector space of dimension κ is the same thing as a rational vector space of cardinality κ ?

$$|\mathbb{Q}| = \aleph_0 = |\mathbb{Z}| = |\mathbb{N}|; \quad |\mathbb{R}| = 2^{\aleph_0} = |\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})|$$

$|\mathbb{Q}^n| = |\mathbb{Q}|$ by induction. If $|A| = \aleph_0$ then $|A \times A| = \aleph_0$

$|\mathbb{Q}^{\omega}| = \aleph_0$ (union of countably many countable sets is countable).

$$\mathbb{Q}^{\omega} = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{Q}^n$$

($\mathcal{P}(A)$ = power set of A)



For κ, λ infinite cardinals, $\kappa + \lambda = \kappa \lambda = \max\{\kappa, \lambda\}$

i.e. if A, B are infinite sets then $|A \cup B| = |A \sqcup B| = |A \times B| = \max\{|A|, |B|\}$.

This uses AC (axiom of choice). (And it's equivalent to AC.)

If κ is an infinite cardinal and V is a rational vector space, then $\dim V = \kappa \Rightarrow |V| = \kappa$.

Proof Let B be a basis of V . Then $|B| \leq |V|$

$$V = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \underbrace{\text{Span}\{v_1, \dots, v_n\}}_{\kappa \cdot \aleph_0 = \kappa}$$

where $|\text{Span}\{v_1, \dots, v_n\}| = |\{a_1 v_1 + \dots + a_n v_n : a_i \in \mathbb{Q}\}| \leq \aleph_0$

The number of choices of $(v_1, \dots, v_n) \in B^n$ is $|B^n| = \underbrace{|B| \times |B| \times \dots \times |B|}_{n \text{ times}} = \kappa^n = \kappa$.

$$|V| = \aleph_0 \cdot \kappa = \kappa.$$

Thus: The theory of rational vector spaces is uncountably categorical but not countably categorical.

Fields

Let F be a set containing distinct elements called 0 and 1 (thus $0 \neq 1$). Suppose addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are defined for all elements of F (except division by 0 is not defined).

Thus $a + b$, $a - b$, ab , $\frac{a}{d} \in F$ whenever $a, b, d \in F$ and $d \neq 0$.

Define $-a = 0 - a$.

If the following properties are satisfied by *all* elements $a, b, c, d \in F$ with $d \neq 0$, then F is a **field**.

$$a + b = b + a \quad a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c \quad ab = ba$$

$$a + 0 = a \quad a(bc) = (ab)c \quad 1a = a$$

$$a + (-a) = 0 \quad a(b + c) = ab + ac \quad \frac{a}{d}d = a$$

$$a + (-b) = a - b$$

A field F has characteristic p if $\underbrace{1+1+\dots+1}_p = 0$. (This requires p to be prime.)

If $1+1+1+1+1+1=0$ then $\underbrace{(1+1+1)}_3 \underbrace{(1+1)}_2 = 0$. If there is no such p then F has characteristic zero.

If we want to force our field to have characteristic 5, say, add an axiom $1+1+1+1 \neq 0$.
If we want to work only with characteristic zero fields, then add infinitely many axioms

$$1+1 \neq 0$$

$$1+1+1 \neq 0$$

$$1+1+1+1 \neq 0$$

$$1+1+1+1+1 \neq 0$$

etc.

The field of complex numbers is the unique (up to isomorphism) algebraically closed field of characteristic zero having cardinality 2^{\aleph_0} .

The theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero is uncountably categorical.

(Not countably categorical.)

First order axioms for "algebraically closed":

for each $n \geq 1$ we add an axiom of the form

$$(\forall a_0)(\forall a_1) \cdots (\forall a_{n-1})(\exists z)(z^n + a_{n-1}z^{n-1} + \cdots + a_1z + a_0 = 0)$$

$$\mathbb{C} \subset \mathbb{C}(x) \subset K = \text{alg. closure of } \mathbb{C}(x) \cong \mathbb{C}$$

$$|\text{Aut } \mathbb{C}| = \text{infinite}$$

Given a field F , the algebraic closure of F is the smallest extension field $\bar{F} \supseteq F$ which is algebraically closed, i.e. containing roots of all polynomials in $F[x]$.

eg. $\bar{\mathbb{R}} = \mathbb{C}$, $\bar{\mathbb{C}} = \mathbb{C}$, $\bar{\mathbb{Q}} = \{\text{algebraic numbers}\} \subset \mathbb{C}$ $|\bar{\mathbb{Q}}| = \aleph_0$

$\mathbb{F}_p = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$, $|\mathbb{F}_p| = \aleph_0$, $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{F}_{p^n}$.

FIELD = {field axioms} (finite set of axioms for all fields)

ALG_CLOS = $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots\}$ α_n is a statement in the language of fields that says every poly. of degree n has a root.

eg. $\alpha_3: (\forall a)(\forall b)(\forall c)(\exists x)(x^3 + ax^2 + bx + c = 0)$ here x^3 is an abbreviation for $x \cdot x \cdot x = (x \cdot x) \cdot x$

ACF = FIELD \cup ALG_CLOS is a set of axioms for algebraically closed fields.

$\mathbb{C} \models \text{ACF}$, $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_7 \models \text{ACF}$, $\bar{\mathbb{Q}} \models \text{ACF}$

The statement $1+1+1+1+1=0$ is true in $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_7$ but not in \mathbb{C} or $\bar{\mathbb{Q}}$.

The theory of algebraically closed fields is not complete ("complete" = "model complete").

$\theta_p: \underbrace{1+1+\dots+1}_p = 0$

$\text{ACF}_p = \text{ACF} \cup \{\theta_p\}$ is a set of axioms for the theory of $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$

i.e. $\text{Th}(\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p) = \{\text{all statements in first-order field theory which hold in } \bar{\mathbb{F}}_p\}$

This theory is complete.

$\text{ACF}_0 = \text{ACF} \cup \{\neg\theta_2, \neg\theta_3, \neg\theta_4, \dots\}$ is a set of axioms for the theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero eg. \mathbb{C} , $\bar{\mathbb{Q}}$ so $\text{Th}(\mathbb{C}) = \text{Th}(\bar{\mathbb{Q}}) = \text{Th}(\text{ACF}_0)$ is complete.

for Every statement Σ in the first order theory of fields is either provable or disprovable from ACF_0 i.e. $ACF_0 \vdash \Sigma$ or $ACF_0 \vdash \neg \Sigma$.

Ax. Grothendieck Theorem Let $f: \mathbb{C}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$ be a polynomial map i.e.

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (f_1(x_1, \dots, x_n), \dots, f_n(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \text{ where } f_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{C}[x_1, \dots, x_n].$$

If f is one-to-one then f is onto.

Proof Take one instance $f(x, y) = (ax^2 + bxy + cy^2 + dx + ey + g, hx^2 + jxy + ky^2 + lx + my + n)$ as an example. Consider the statement θ in first-order field theory given by

$$\theta: (\forall a)(\forall b) \dots (\forall a) \left[\underbrace{(\forall x_1)(\forall y_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall y_2) (f(x_1, y_1) = f(x_2, y_2) \rightarrow (x_1 = x_2 \wedge y_1 = y_2))}_{\text{"f is one-to-one"}} \rightarrow \underbrace{(\forall x_1)(\forall y_1)(\exists x_2)(\exists y_2) (f(x_1, y_1) = (x_2, y_2))}_{\text{"f is onto"}} \right]$$

We must prove $\mathbb{C} \models \theta$. If not then $\mathbb{C} \models \neg \theta$ and $ACF_0 \vdash \neg \theta$. Consider a proof of $\neg \theta$ from ACF_0 . Such a proof uses only finitely many of the axioms $\neg \theta_p$. There is some prime p for which $\neg \theta_p$ is not used in the proof of $\neg \theta$. So $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ ($\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \theta_p$) satisfies $\neg \theta$ ($\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \neg \theta$). However, $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \theta$. Why? Given $a, b, c, \dots, n \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p = \bigcup_{r=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ so pick r so that $a, b, \dots, n \in \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$. f defines a polynomial map $\mathbb{F}_{p^r} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ which is one-to-one and therefore onto. Now \mathbb{F}_{p^r} satisfies $\theta \wedge \neg \theta$, a contradiction. \square

Łoś-Vaught Test assures us that $\text{Th}(\text{ACF}_0)$ is complete. This uses: the theory has no finite models; and the theory is 2^{\aleph_0} -categorical.

L t Jerzy Łoś, Robert Vaught (1954)